



For a determined and level-headed response to Putin's war

Impulses for civil solutions

Rethinking security - right now!

Suggestions for orientation
and free use

WG Civil Crisis Intervention

Rethinking Security Initiative

www.sicherheitneudenken.de

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Preface

The war in Ukraine confronts us all with a dilemma. Of course, we would like to protect the people of Ukraine. But a no-fly zone would probably only be realized at the cost of a further expansion of the war and even more suffering - with the danger of nuclear war.

We feel powerless in the face of the brutality with which President Putin tries to enforce his goals by force – thereby making it impossible to achieve them.

At the root of every war lies a more or less complex conflict. In the search for ways to end this war as quickly and with as little further suffering as possible, it is essential to be aware of and accept the complexity of the conflict in its entirety.

We, the authors of these impulses, know little about many aspects of this conflict. Not one of us has ever been to Ukraine or even lived there.

For this reason, we offer everything we have collected in terms of impulses with all due restraint for consideration and discussion. We are not interested in being right, but rather with mutual understanding to further a rapid end to the war.

In particular, these impulses shed light on our own contributions to the conflict, which most of us are unconscious of. We are not justifying President Putin's brutal war of aggression against Ukraine. History teaches us that without considering the reasons why a conflict has arisen, we cannot resolve it.

This war cannot be ended by force. Neither NATO nor the UN find it justifiable to use force against President Putin for a no-fly zone, for example. But then we only have the arduous path of striving for understanding if we want to end the suffering in Ukraine as quickly as possible.

We are aware that President Putin is also waging this war because he sees his almost dictatorial power threatened by the democracy movements in Belarus and Ukraine. The question is how human rights can best and sustainably be protected.

Today, on March 17 2022, the Berghof Foundation published 11 peace pedagogical foods for thought for dealing with the Ukraine war, the spirit of which we are committed to:¹

1. show solidarity and strengthen civil society,
2. escort refugees and offer support,
3. enable conversations, actively listen, change perspectives,
4. question information and different points of view,
5. analyse war and ask for background information,
6. reflect on political reactions, expand diplomacy and non-violent alternatives,
7. organize dialogues and look for common ground,
8. make values visible and recognise dilemmas,
9. prepare for peace and develop non-violent approaches to action,
10. recognise uncertainties, endure contradictions and protect oneself,
11. think working for peace and climate protection together.

For the Authors' Group

Ralf Becker

¹ see <https://berghof-foundation.org/news/friedenspaedagogische-denkanstoesse-fuer-den-umgang-mit-krieg>

1

Summary

Encounter President Putin with resolute clarity and consistency and with signals of de-escalation

1. We demand an immediate end to Russia's unjustifiable war of aggression.

2. We support the fact that the war started by President Putin is met with clarity and consistency, with clear language and determination.

Sanctions, however questionable and ambivalent they are in their effect, are the non-violent means of choice.

3. In addition to signals of determination, also send signs of de-escalation.

In addition to signals of determination and determination, there is also a need for signals to de-escalate the conflict.

"Wars are not constant processes, so opportunities for negotiation and dialogue must be considered at every stage. Whether the possibility of negotiation arises is also based on previous communication:

For example, do public speeches by politicians contain not only sanctions and signals of determination but also signs of de-escalating the conflict? ... Even after negotiations start, the peace-logical perspective is crucial: Are the suffering and the worries of the other side also taken into account?"²

4. Interrupt escalation dynamics.

Violence and counter-violence, even if self-defense is legitimate, drive a spiral of violence that threatens to get out of control.

The alternative to understanding would be a mutual war of annihilation. On the scale of conflict escalation developed by Prof. Glasl, the Ukraine war is already moving between level 7 and 8 out of 9 levels and tends to level 9: "Together into doom".³

The impulses compiled here aim to prevent this development.

5. We need a narrative for de-escalation and reduction of violence.

"Because speeches, articles and discussion programmes influence public discourse, people are needed who convey inclusive and peace-promoting narratives and, most importantly, a peace-promoting logic of thinking and speaking.

² said

³ Friedrich Glasl, The 9 Stages of Conflict Escalation, <https://www.sicherheitneudenken.de/media/download/variant/272459/friedrich-glasl-9-stufen-der-konflikt-eskalation.pdf>

Therefore, even in this conflict, we should reflect on the attitude we take to the turn of events and which narratives we carry forward. In particular, now that the sanctions against Russia are in force and the country's isolation has become clear, there must be room for a narrative of the circumstances under which peace would be conceivable and what steps can contribute to de-escalation and reduction of violence."⁴

These orientation modules are meant exactly in this sense.

6. The long-standing diplomatic efforts were right.

They failed for the time being because they did not go far enough and were not pursued consistently enough.

7. Tensions between Russia and Ukraine have built up since Ukraine was promised NATO membership in 2008.

The consistent pursuit and implementation of the perspective of a sustainable European Peace and Security Order, which was supported and hoped for by all sides in the 90s, was neglected.

George Kennan, author of the policy the US pursued since 1947 to contain the Soviet Union, warned as early as 1997 of the consequences of NATO's eastward expansion as a "fatal mistake" that furthered nationalism.

8. Peace and understanding need a change of perspective.

Taking Russia's perspective does not mean sharing it. In order to avoid a long-standing war of attrition on both sides, offers of face-saving peaceful solutions for both presidents are needed.

For example, the CFE Adaptation Agreement on the Limitation of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe did not enter into force, although Russia ratified it in 2004. In NATO, the US blocked ratification of the AKSE Treaty after George W. Bush took office as president in 2001.

Peace and reconciliation require investing energy in a change of perspective, i.e. the consideration of conflicts also from the perspective of the conflict partner. These orientation modules are understood in this sense. To perceive perspectives from Russia's point of view does not mean to share them. Explaining does not mean justifying or apologizing.

Understanding perspectives does not mean accepting them. Understanding means trying to analyse why someone acts the way he/she does. Only on the basis of a mutual change of perspective is a conversation at eye level possible.

9. To overcome the war with "both/as" instead of "either/or".

Every conflict that escalates - and a war even more so - leads to the abandonment of complex thinking in favor of simplifications and clear friend/foe images. We should insist on shedding light on the entire history and dynamics of this conflict, which often means not relying on an "either/or" but on a "both/and".

⁴ Cora Bieß, Dr Marcel Vondermaßen, Peace-logical reflection on narratives used in Germany about the war in Ukraine, International Centre for Ethics in the Sciences (IZEW) the University of Tübingen, 10.03.2022, <https://uni-tuebingen.de/de/228505>

"Even if no cooperation seems possible at present, peace-logical communication is still important. To think in a logic of peace (Lammers 2020) means to consider the current developments as violence that is taking place or is imminent. This violence is not understood in a friend/foe dichotomy, but is a consequence of complex conflicts, including the reflection of one's own parts of the conflict.

This is all the more true today because war situations make complex analyses more difficult, as Werner Wintersteiner emphasizes: "Every conflict that escalates - and a war even more so - leads to complex thinking being abandoned in favor of simplifications and clear friend/foe images. On the other hand, we must insist on shedding light on the entire history and dynamics of this conflict, which often means relying not on an 'either/or' but on a 'both/and'."

From the perspective of peace logic, conflict management can only be carried out cooperatively. From a peace-logical point of view, the focus of the current war situation is therefore to think of possible steps towards de-escalation in a process-oriented and dialogue-oriented manner in order to prevent further escalation stages."⁵

Right now, the dialogue orientation includes continuing as many contacts as possible with civil society in Russia, e.g. in the form of partnerships – adapted to the current situation.

10. Peace logic thinks from the good end. Develop de-escalating options for action.

Options for action are needed at all levels, for all actors, in order to end the war as quickly as possible and to transform it into a stable peace order through conflict resolution. It is important to increase the number of conflict resolution variants that have been taken into account.

11. De-escalation options include:

- NATO and the EU, in line with President Zelenskyi's offer, could signal to Russia their support for negotiations on Ukraine's future neutrality with international security guarantees.
- The EU could propose negotiations to Russia on a single EU/EAEU economic area from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
- Mediation initiatives of the UN Secretary-General or the Pope.
- Active and coordinated, professional civil resistance

Armed resistance takes on average 3 times as long as nonviolent resistance. Active non-violent resistance is just as successful against violent occupiers as violent resistance - and is associated with far less human suffering and death as well as costs.

Contrary to what is often claimed, the goal of nonviolent resistance is not to arouse the compassion of dictators or to persuade oppressors to repent. Rather, nonviolent resistance is aimed at weakening the power of the opponent so that he can no longer cause damage.

To do this, one analyzes on which pillars the opponent's power rests, identifies weak points and develops strategies to exploit them and bring down certain pillars. Nonviolent resistance specifically seeks to limit access to resources, exacerbate internal conflicts, or persuade individual groups to engage in overt or covert non-cooperation.

⁵ Cora Bieß, Dr Marcel Vondermaßen, We must think of war from the point of view of peace, International Centre for Ethics in the Sciences (IZEW) the University of Tübingen, 10.03.2022, <https://uni-tuebingen.de/einrichtungen/zentrale-einrichtungen/internationales-zentrum-fuer-ethik-in-den-wissenschaften/publikationen/blog-bedenkzeiten/wir-muessen-den-krieg-vom-frieden-her-denken/>

12. Negotiate an inclusive European Peace and Security Order.

The willingness to acknowledge, endure and constructively deal with normative differences is one of the fundamental requirements of any conflict resolution and, in particular, of a sustainable pan-European order.

The sustainability of democratic, constitutional and human rights values also depend on the extent to which they allow the peaceful and constructive resolution of security policy conflicts with the normative other and dispense with ideological confrontation.

13. We support the solidarity commitment of our people and EU governments to refugees and humanitarian aid for war victims.

14. We disagree with the announced massive increase in military spending and the planned codification of military spending in our constitution.

In the short term, we demand 10% of the planned military expenditure annually for a civil conflict management and crisis prevention plan:

- Increased contributions for OSCE and UN, civilian crisis prevention and peacebuilding
- Expansion of international mediation, peace attachés in every German embassy
- Instruments / structures for the constructive processing of intra-societal conflicts
- Anchoring a constructive culture of conflict in the breadth of our society
- Peace education and training in social defence
- Personnel increases for international police missions
- Training and deployment of civilian peace professionals
- Education and training in civil conflict management for society as a whole
- 100 educational promoters for civil conflict management

15. There is no alternative to the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons to shape a responsible future that relies on the strength of law instead of the right of strength.

President Putin's threat to use nuclear weapons has made this danger apparent. This can only be repealed by the accession of Germany and all other states to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

The German government should call on the NATO nuclear-weapon states and Russia to issue a joint declaration on the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons and to start arms control negotiations immediately after the end of the war.

16. The solution to the climate crisis also requires a rapid agreement with Russia that overcomes violence.

17. Rethinking security

It is necessary to overcome patriarchal power structures and thought patterns.

2

Demand an immediate end to Russia's unjustifiable war of aggression

(largely taken from an article in Le Monde diplomatique)⁶

We are appalled by the war in Ukraine and the suffering caused by this war.

In accordance with the resolution of the UN General Assembly of March 2 2022, we demand an immediate end to Russia's military war of aggression.⁷

The United Nations' highest court, the International Court of Justice in The Hague, has also ordered Russia to end the war against Ukraine immediately.⁸

We feel even more powerless and helpless in the face of this war, which grieves us so much, than in the case of the numerous other wars from which countless people in the world are suffering at the same time.⁹

A war of aggression is per se contrary to international law. But the Russian armed forces, which invaded Ukraine on February 24 and are bombing the country, have already violated the rules of international humanitarian law in the first ten days, which are intended to ensure the greatest possible protection of the civilian population during a war.

The attacks are increasingly directed against residential districts, civilian infrastructure such as electricity, gas and water pipes and, above all, hospitals. If the fighting drags on for a long time, Ukrainian cities could suffer the same fate as Grozny, which was largely destroyed by Russian forces in the First Chechen War in 1995.

Because people want to escape a humanitarian catastrophe, another catastrophe is already in full swing: After twelve days of war, more than 1.5 million people, mainly women and children, had already fled from Ukraine to the neighboring countries of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that the war could eventually displace at least 4.5 million people from their homes.



A strong signal: 141 states demand in the UN resolution of March 2 "that the Russian Federation immediately cease its use of force against Ukraine and refrain from any further unlawful threat or use of force against a member state". Only four states besides Russia reject the resolution.⁷

⁶ Andreas Zumach, Putin's War, Russia's Crisis, Le Monde diplomatique, 10.03.2022, <https://monde-diplomatique.de/artikel/!5830499>

⁷ see <https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/amerika/un-vollversammlung-ukraine-105.html>

⁸ see <https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/europa/igh-zu-ukraine-101.html>, 16.03.2022

⁹ Examples are the ongoing wars in Syria, Libya, Yemen, Ethiopia, Somalia and Yemen as well as in the Congo called.

When this end will come – and with what result – is currently unpredictable. What is certain, however, is who started this war. Not only did the Russian president give the order to attack Ukraine, Putin also prepared the invasion for a long time, including lies and systematic deception.

Western diplomats and high-ranking interlocutors such as President Macron and Chancellor Scholz, who sought to de-escalate in direct talks with Putin and his Foreign Minister Lavrov in the weeks before the attack, were "coldly lied to" and "tricked," as the German foreign minister put it.¹⁰

Lavrov, in particular, had repeatedly asserted that an attack on Ukraine was "not planned". On the other hand, the warnings of the US intelligence agencies, which were communicated unusually openly by the Biden administration, were dismissed as "mere hysteria".

But Putin has not only alienated "the West". Russia is also completely isolated in the UN. In the 77-year history of the world organization, this has not yet happened to a permanent member of the UN Security Council. In the 15-member body, Moscow managed to prevent the adoption of a resolution with the help of its veto right at an emergency meeting on the night of February 26. But the Russian one remained the only dissenting voice, while India, China and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) abstained.

However, the failure of the Ukraine resolution in the Security Council led to an emergency meeting of the UN General Assembly, at which 141 of the 193 member states – almost three-quarters of a majority – voted on March 2 for a resolution entitled "Aggression against Ukraine". The UAE also voted yes. The resolution calls for an "immediate ceasefire" followed by an "unconditional and complete withdrawal of all Russian forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders."¹¹

Apart from Russia, only Belarus, North Korea, Syria and Eritrea voted against this resolution. In addition to China, India and Iran, the 35 states that abstained included countries such as Cuba or Nicaragua, which had generally supported Russia's position in previous votes.¹²

Resolution A/ES-11/L.1 states that "the military attacks by the Russian armed forces" have reached "a level that the international community has not experienced in Europe for decades." It underscores the "sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders." In addition, the Putin government



"The chancellor was lied to, I was lied to by the Russian Foreign Minister, the entire international community."¹⁰

Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock on 24.02.2022

¹⁰ Annalena Baerbock, ntv, 24 February 2022, <https://www.n-tv.de/politik/Baerbock-Russland-hat-uns-eiskalt-belogen-article23153413.html>

¹¹ The text of the resolution adopted on 2 March was published in six languages, see www.undocs.org

¹² 12 of the 193 Member States were not present at the vote, including Venezuela, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

is to reverse its "recognition" of the eastern Ukrainian republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, which was announced on February 21 and ratified by the Duma.

In the General Assembly, the vote for this resolution was also so clear because Putin's order to attack was issued during the emergency meeting of the Security Council, which wanted to prevent the war at the last hour on the evening of February 23.

Such a provocation, unprecedented in UN history, has been perceived by many member states as a serious affront to the world organization. The extent of the outrage over the behaviour of the Russian veto power is shown by the fact that no fewer than 120 ambassadors spoke during the two-day debate in the General Assembly.

Such a clear "guilty verdict" by the UN General Assembly in an armed international conflict is extremely rare. In any case, according to the UN Charter, the "main responsibility" lies with the UN Security Council for a "threat" or the "breach of peace and international security". The latter may adopt "peace-settlement measures" under Chapter 6 of the Charter or even order political, economic or military coercive measures against the respective peacebreaker under Chapter 7.

When the Security Council could not assume this responsibility in 1950 during the Korean War because it was blocked by a veto by the Soviet Union and unable to act, the General Assembly took over this responsibility. On 3 November 1950, at the request of the United States and Great Britain, it adopted Resolution 377 A ("Uniting for Peace"). It created the mechanism of an emergency special session in the event of a blocked resolution.

Such a "special emergency session" of the General Assembly has only taken place eleven times since 1950. The eleventh was that of March 2, 2022. With the resolution on Putin's war in Ukraine, however, the General Assembly condemned a member of the Security Council for only the third time – and each time it hit the government in Moscow: the first time in January 1980 after the recent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the second time in March 2014, when the General Assembly condemned Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea by 100 votes to 11 with 58 abstentions.

This has never happened to the three Western veto powers in the Security Council, i.e. the USA, Great Britain and France. Thanks to their political, economic and military power, they have managed to prevent a condemnation of their wars in violation of international law or of their war and occupation crimes.

This applies, for example, to the US Vietnam War (1964–1975), France's war in Algeria (1954–1962) or British participation in the Iraq War of 2003. When South Africa attempted to classify this war of a "coalition

of the willing" as contrary to international law in a General Assembly resolution, the then US administration of George W. Bush was able to nip this initiative in the bud with massive threats against Pretoria.

The conduct of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council has so far been assessed according to very different standards. This has to be sharply criticized, but is in no way a reason to trivialise or even legitimise the war against Ukraine. There is not the slightest justification for this illegal and criminal attack.

Putin's propaganda lies about the "genocide" in Donbass or the "Nazi government" in Kiev are too absurd anyway. However, this does not apply to Putin's references to the violations of international law by Western states, for example NATO's Kosovo war, which was started without a UN mandate. Given what happened in Kosovo in 1999, several of the claims currently being made in the West by the political class as well as by many media outlets about the military attack on Ukraine are false.

Putin neither started "the first war against the European Peace Order" nor "violently violated borders for the first time in Europe", becoming the first to violate the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE or the Paris "Charter for a New Europe" of 1990.

This reasoning ignores the fact that NATO used military means to resolve political conflicts for the first time in 1999 with its air war against Serbia and Montenegro in violation of international law. And that by recognising Kosovo's secession from Serbia, the West has for the first time since 1990 in Europe abandoned the principle that borders must not be changed by force.

3

Appreciation of long-standing diplomatic efforts and the clear and united response to the war

The intensive diplomatic efforts of the Federal Government and its predecessors, which continued until the beginning of the war on February 24, deserve lasting recognition.

They were right, responsible and justified – even if they could not prevent the military escalation due to a lack of insight into their own contributions to the escalation of the conflict and due to missing further

negotiation offers.¹³ To degrade this effort in retrospect does not do justice to the matter.

And we support the fact that the war started by President Putin is met by the EU and internationally with clarity and consistency, with clear language and determination.

Sanctions, however questionable and ambivalent in their effect, are the non-violent means of choice, in addition to the clear resolution of the UN General Assembly.

4

The war in Ukraine: The result of a lack of conflict sensitivity, among others?

With the announcement in the German Bundestag on February 27 of a one-time special fund for the Bundeswehr in the amount of 100 billion euros and drastically increasing defense spending of over 2% of our GDP, Olaf Scholz is trying to free himself and the Federal Government from a long-lasting tension. A tension that has built up significantly between NATO and Russia since the promise of NATO accession to Ukraine and Georgia in 2008.¹⁴

The EU's pressure on Ukraine since 2013 to decide between joining the EU or the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) with Russia, has also increased tensions within Ukraine and between Russia and the West, and in 2014 contributed to a first escalation of tension due to Russia's annexation of Crimea in violation of international law.¹⁵

Eastern Ukraine and Russia have always been a single economic area without customs borders. Therefore, all – changing – narrow majority decisions of Ukraine for or against the EU and EAEU as well as for or against NATO accession contributed to the increasing division of the country.



"A country cannot be a member of a customs union and a far-reaching free trade area with the EU at the same time."

EU Commission President José Manuel Barroso addressed Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich on February 25, 2013¹⁵

¹³ Prof. Dr. Johannes Varwick, "The offer was not enough", taz, February 23, 2022, <https://taz.de/Politologe-zu-Putins-Eskalation/!5837350/>

¹⁴ Of course, the democratic revolutions in Ukraine and other countries, especially the uprising in Belarus, have also helped to build up these tensions by endangering Vladimir Putin's despotic power system. Further tensions between NATO and Russia are examined below.

¹⁵ The then President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, declared in February 2013 with regard to a possible customs union between Ukraine and Russia that a country could not be a member of a customs union and at the same time in a far-reaching free trade area with the EU. Ukraine must decide which path it wants to take. See https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine_und_die_Europäische_Union and <http://www.derwesten.de/politik/ukraine-will-sich-nicht-auf-eu-festlegen-id7657836.html>

If the EU, if the West had reacted to these internal tensions of Ukraine and the associated and steadily increasing tensions between the EU and NATO with Russia in a similarly conflict-sensitive way as in Northern Ireland during the negotiation of Brexit, the current escalation of violence could probably have been prevented.

Creative solutions were found for the customs border between the EU and Great Britain in Northern Ireland, which have so far prevented a violent escalation of the conflict there – although not yet permanently secured.

Likewise, Ukraine has failed to grant its Russian-speaking citizens in eastern Ukraine – as agreed in Minsk II – extensive autonomy, which led to lasting pacification in 1918 in a very similar almost military conflict between Finland and Sweden over the Åland Islands.¹⁶

And what other developments might have occurred if we had exerted decisive influence to persuade the Ukrainian parliament to adopt a de-escalating language policy when it banned Russian as an official language in 2019 with effect from January 1, 2022.¹⁷

In a similarly escalated conflict over the autonomy and language rights of the large Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia, numerous European institutions intervened in 1991 under the auspices of the OSCE and were thus able to prevent a military intervention by Russia, which was also threatening at the time.¹⁸

A fully valid democracy also includes the recognition of minority rights, which many in Russia and eastern Ukraine rightly see drastically curtailed with regard to the large Russian-speaking minority in Ukraine. However, President Putin's accusation of genocide is absurd.

Russia, too, has long been escalating the conflict with Ukraine, there is no question about that. But is it plausible to blame President Putin alone for the escalation of the conflict? Aren't we ignoring our own co-responsibility for the current war?

President Putin has undoubtedly become radicalized in recent years and adopted unreal ideas – but this is probably also a consequence of his two decades of futile attempts to resolve essential conflict issues between Russia and NATO and the EU through talks and negotiations.

None of this justifies the current brutal criminal violence in Ukraine. But this violence and the current suffering in Ukraine also do not justify ignoring our own part in this escalation of violence and accusing



"The West has good reasons to think about its own mistakes. Why it in 2007 did not take more seriously what was said by Vladimir Putin at the time. Why in 2008 the American government's push [for a NATO accession perspective for Ukraine and Georgia] was not rejected even more vehemently, namely – from the Russian point of view – as the crossing of a red line."⁸³

MSC Chairman Wolfgang Ischinger at the Federal Press Conference on February 2, 2022

¹⁶ Forum Crisis Prevention, see <https://sicherheitneudenken.eki-musterhausen.de/html/media/dl.html?v=191548>

¹⁷ see <https://www.derstandard.de/story/2000102038947/ukrainische-parlament-beschliesst-gesetz-gegen-russische-sprache> as well as <https://m.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/ukraine-neues-sprachgesetz-soll-das-russische-zurueckdraengen-17736397.amp.html>

¹⁸ Forum Crisis Prevention, see <https://sicherheitneudenken.eki-musterhausen.de/html/media/dl.html?v=191548>

⁸³ see <https://www.ardmediathek.de/video/phoenix-vor-ort/msc-report-mit-wolfgang-ischinger/phoenix/Y3JpZDovL3Bob2VuaXguZGUvMjUwOT10A>

President Putin afterwards of an escalation of violence that has been planned for years.

Since his speech in the German Bundestag in 2001, Vladimir Putin has repeatedly and increasingly emphasized that NATO's eastward expansion is toeing a red line for Russia's security interests. In his 2007 incendiary speech at the Munich Security Conference, for example, he warned NATO very clearly not to move further east.¹⁹

Retired Colonel Wolfgang Richter from the Security Policy Research Group of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) impressively explains in his articles for this foundation and the Federal Agency for Civic Education what joint responsibility the West bears for the Ukraine crisis and the previous erosion of the European Security Order.²⁰

In order to achieve the historical turnaround in 1990, the joint arms control agreements played a key role. By 1991, all of the approximately 2,700 medium-range systems had been destroyed in accordance with the treaty, which served mutual security interests.

"At the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999, the CFE States Parties signed the CFE Adaptation Agreement (AKSE [on the limitation of conventional forces in Europe]). The CFE Adjustment Agreement did not enter into force, although Russia ratified it in 2004. In NATO, the US blocked ratification of the AKSE Treaty after George W. Bush took office as president in 2001.

Although Germany did not share this view, it did not want to breach alliance solidarity.

Although the AKSE did not come into force due to the blockade by the USA, states that are not members of the CFE treaty regime joined NATO from 2004 onwards. Thus, on Russia's borders, namely in the Baltic states, potential stationing areas of the alliance were created, which are not subject to legally valid arms control rules."²¹



"The West shares responsibility for the Ukraine crisis and the previous erosion of the European Security Order."

Retired Colonel Wolfgang Richter, Research Group Security Policy of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), September 9, 2016 and February 11, 2022⁸⁴

¹⁹ see <https://www.merkur.de/politik/putin-siko-muenchen-russland-ukraine-sicherheitskonferenz-nato-krise-major-91357015.html>

²⁰ Wolfgang Richter, The West shares responsibility for the Ukraine crisis, bpb, September 5, 2016, <https://www.bpb.de/themen/kriege-konflikte/innerstaatliche-konflikte/233440/meinung-der-westen-traegt-eine-mitverantwortung-fuer-die-ukraine-krise/>

²¹ Wolfgang Richter, Ukraine in the NATO-Russia field of tension: Security agreements and arms control must be revived, SWP-Aktuell 2022/A 11, February 11, 2022, <https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/ukraine-im-nato-russland-spannungsfeld>

⁸⁴ Wolfgang Richter, The West shares responsibility for the Ukraine crisis, bpb, September 5, 2016, <https://www.bpb.de/themen/kriege-konflikte/innerstaatliche-konflikte/233440/meinung-der-westen-traegt-eine-mitverantwortung-fuer-die-ukraine-krise/> as well as Ukraine in the NATO-Russia field of tension: Security agreements and arms control must be revived, SWP-Aktuell 2022/A 11, February 11, 2022, <https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/ukraine-im-nato-russland-spannungsfeld>

The following year, according to the OSCE expert, the Bush administration "encouraged" Georgian President Saakashvili to attack Russian peacekeepers legitimized by the UN and OSCE in August 2008.²²

5

In 1990, Germany and the USA orally promised that NATO would not expand eastwards

It is often claimed that it is a lie of President Vladimir Putin that the West promised the Soviet Union the non-expansion of NATO in 1990. This is only true insofar as President Gorbachev apparently renounced in good faith a written confirmation of this commitment in return for a monetary payment of five billion Deutschmark.²³

In any case, verbal commitments were made by Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Ministers Genscher and Baker (USA). This commitment demonstrably also referred to the states east of Germany, not only to East Germany, as Andreas Zumach (independent journalist and member of the nationwide coordination group of our initiative) testified as an ear witness, as well as various documents prove.²⁴²⁵

On January 31, 1990, for example, in a public speech at the Evangelical Academy in Tutzing, Hans-Dietrich Genscher called on NATO to clearly declare "whatever happens in the Warsaw Pact, there will be no expansion of NATO territory to the east, that is, closer to the borders of the Soviet Union". This security guarantee was important for the Soviet Union, because the change in Eastern Europe and the German unification

²² said

²³ see <https://www.mdr.de/geschichte/zwei-plus-vier-verhandlungen-deutsche-einheit-100.html>

as well as <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/sowjetunion-nato-osterweiterung-kohl-gorbatschow-1.5494161>

²⁴ said

²⁵ see "Documents from Western archives support Russian suspicion.", Der Spiegel, November 22, 11, 2009

<https://www.spiegel.de/politik/absurde-vorstellung-a-a18a7cab-0002-0001-0000-000067871653?context=issue>, according to which Mikhail Gorbachev said at the time, "Of course, there was a commitment to not extend a thumb wide to the east of NATO." The US Ambassador to Moscow at the time, Jack Matlock, also confirmed that Moscow had received a "clear commitment".

Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher spoke with SU Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on February 10, 1990 between 4 and 6.30 p.m. - and the longtime secret German note on this conversation states: "BM (Federal Minister): We are aware that the affiliation of a united Germany to NATO raises complicated questions. For us, however, one thing is certain: NATO will not expand eastwards." And since the conversation was mainly about the GDR, Genscher expressly added: "As far as the non-expansion of NATO is concerned, this applies in general." For further documents see <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/sowjetunion-nato-osterweiterung-kohl-gorbatschow-1.5494161>

process "should not lead to an impairment of Soviet security interests."²⁶

It is also undisputed that on February 9, 1990, in the Kremlin's magnificent Katharinensaal, US Secretary of State Baker declared that NATO would not "extend its sphere of influence one inch further east" if the Soviets agreed to NATO membership of a united Germany.²⁷

The unification of Germany in 1990 was decisively based on the personal relationship of trust established between Chancellor Kohl, Soviet President Gorbachev and Foreign Ministers Genscher and Shevardnadze. In such a relationship of trust, what is said goes. Therefore, the Russian President Vladimir Putin's accusation that words were broken is at least understandable.

In Moscow, there has long been a political consensus of being deceived by the West across all political camps, from the national patriots to the Communists to Putin's United Russia party: The West broke its word and pulled Russia over the barrel when it was weak.²⁸

Could it be that we would feel the same way if we had been in their shoes?

None other than George Kennan, the American diplomat and historian who is regarded as the originator of the containment policy pursued by the US since 1947 during the Cold War to contain Soviet imperialism, warned as early as 1997 of NATO's eastward expansion as a "fatal mistake".²⁹

Kennan particularly regretted that this expansion strategy was pursued against a Russia that is "in a state of high uncertainty or even paralysis" under then-President Boris Yeltsin.

But even more worrying is "that there is no need at all for this step". Why should East-West relations, Kennan pointed out, "given all the hopeful possibilities that the end of the Cold War has produced, be primarily about the question of who allies themselves with whom – and implicitly against whom?"

George F. Kennan served as a diplomat from 1926 to 1963, and ultimately as chief foreign policy adviser to the Kennedy administration. Before the Second World War he had been stationed in Tallinn, Riga and Moscow, then in Prague in 1939 and in Berlin until 1942. In 1944/45 Kennan was again in Moscow. He was fluent in Russian and



"Chancellor Kohl, US Secretary of State Baker and I promised in Moscow that NATO should not be expanded to include new members from Eastern Europe."

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on his return from his meeting with Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and President Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow on February 11, 1990²⁵

²⁶ see "Eastward expansion of NATO: What did Genscher promise?", FAZ, April 19, 2014, <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ost-erweiterung-der-nato-was-versprach-genscher-12902411.html>

²⁷ see "Documents from Western archives support Russian suspicion.", Der Spiegel, November 22, 2009 <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/absurde-vorstellung-a-a18a7cab-0002-0001-0000-000067871653?context=issue>

²⁸ said

²⁹ George Kennan, A Fateful Error, New York Times, February 5, 1997, <https://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/05/opinion/a-fateful-error.html>

had studied Russian history – also in Berlin. His analytical understanding of Russia's security needs and interests was based on his knowledge of the country and its historical traumas.

This distinguishes him from many who speak in the current debates about Russia and President Putin without historical background knowledge and do not want to relativise or review the experiences and lessons of the Ost- and Détente policy of the 1960s and 1970s, but want to dispose of them completely.

Incidentally, not only Kennan warned in the 1990s against a NATO eastward expansion. Other diplomats and politicians from the US also called at the time to take Moscow's "legitimate security interests" into account. And in reunified Germany in 1995, Peter Glotz, former Secretary General of the Social Democratic Party, criticized NATO's eastward expansion plans in a Spiegel essay entitled "Juicy Stupidity" with arguments that even anticipated Kennan's intervention:

"This draws a new, arbitrary border through Eastern Europe, strengthens the Great-Russian faction in Moscow, endangers disarmament agreements with Russia and weakens the Alliance's decision-making capacity."³⁰

A note from a meeting of the political directors of the foreign ministries of the USA, Great Britain, France and Germany in Bonn on March 6, 1991 also shows that the British, Americans, Germans and French still agreed in 1991 that NATO membership of Eastern Europeans was "unacceptable". Bonn's representative Jürgen Chrobog declared: "We have made it clear in the two-plus-four negotiations that we are not expanding NATO beyond the Elbe. We cannot therefore offer Poland and the others NATO membership."³¹

Since 1993 – long before Putin's regime – Russia has been claiming that extending NATO eastwards violates the spirit of this two-plus-four treaty. This is obviously how Chrobog saw it. According to the note, the Russian complaint coincides with the official position of the Federal Government of Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU) and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) in 1991.

And in 1991, the Americans also saw the situation as Putin portrays it today. U.S. Representative Raymond Seitz agreed with Chrobog, saying: "We have made it clear to the Soviet Union – in two-plus-four as well as other talks – that we will not take advantage of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe... NATO should not expand to the east, either formally or informally."

³⁰ Peter Glotz, "Juicy Stupidity", Der Spiegel, September 17, 1995.

³¹ „New file find from 1991 supports Russian accusation", Der Spiegel, February 18, 2022, <https://www.spiegel.de/ausland/nato-osterweiterung-aktenfund-stuetzt-russische-version-a-1613d467-bd72-4f02-8e16-2cd6d3285295>

This archive document fits in with a wealth of documents from the months after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which are now available. However, the West did not reach a binding agreement with the Kremlin under international law that precludes NATO's eastward expansion. Rather, in 1990, many of the politicians and officials involved on both sides acted in good faith.

Of course, it is true that in the 1990s more and more former Eastern Bloc countries sought admission to NATO, which was their right. However, anyone who attended the signing ceremony of the Charter of Paris in 1990 knows that this development only began when these countries realised that the NATO states did not want to set up the common (including Russia) security organisation under the umbrella of the OSCE, which had been agreed upon by all.

Russia even agreed to the admission of numerous former Eastern Bloc states to NATO under certain conditions. However, these conditions were increasingly undermined after the change of government in the USA from 2001 onwards (*see Chapter 4*).

6

Focus on de-escalation of the spiral of violence

Even during his deployment of troops to the borders of Ukraine in 2021 and to this day, Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasises that he is essentially concerned with Ukraine's neutrality in the current war.³²

Meanwhile, Vladimir Putin apparently links the war in Ukraine with his personal fate, he gives the impression of an emotionally very moved, very aggressive leader, who may not refrain from using nuclear weapons or damaging nuclear power plants.³³

NATO's de-escalating options

In view of President Putin's increasing brutality, all the more rational de-escalating signals from the West, i.e. NATO and the EU, to Vladimir

³² see <https://www.tagesschau.de/newsticker/liveblog-ukraine-krieg-dienstag-101.html>

of March 1, 2022 – he also mentioned goals of "denazification of the government of Ukraine" and "demilitarisation of Ukraine".

³³ Ulrich Kühn, Head of Research on Arms Control and New Technologies at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg: "That would be complete madness, Russian nuclear forces on alert? Peace researcher Ulrich Kühn fears a nuclear escalation – and warns against calls for NATO", "<https://taz.de/Waffenexperte-ueber-Russlands-Aggression/!5838971/?s=04>

Putin are now necessary. Violence and counter-violence, even if self-defense is legitimate, drive a spiral of violence that regularly causes it to spiral out of control.³⁴

It is therefore right and appropriate for NATO to try to prevent military escalation in the form of an extension of the conflict to other countries.

NATO and the EU, in line with President Zelenskyi's offer, could clearly signal to Russia their support for negotiations on Ukraine's future neutrality with international security guarantees.³⁵

Of course, Ukraine has the right to self-defense by force. According to scientific findings, however, violent defence regularly entails far higher human costs than – scientifically proven – equally effective civil defence.³⁶

According to the UN Charter, Germany, like all other nations, would even have the right to fight violently on the Ukrainians' side.³⁷

But we all know that this would be irresponsible in view of the associated potential for escalation, which is why President Zelenskyi's understandable request for a no-fly zone is rightly rejected by our responsible politicians. Putin has the second largest nuclear arsenal in the world and is determined to enforce his goals by force.

At the moment, it seems irresponsible to the international community to fight together with Ukrainians by force for their freedom. It is good that the world is reacting to Putin's attack with a clear UN resolution and decisive low-violence sanctions – as double-edged as sanctions are in their effect.³⁸

³⁴ cf. German Bishops' Conference, March 10, 2022, <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/bischoefe-waffenlieferungen-ukraine-krieg-103.html>

³⁵ see <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/absage-an-gebietsabtrennungen-selenskyj-offenbar-bereit-ueber-neutralitaet-der-ukraine-zu-verhandeln/28140644.html>

³⁶ see <https://www.sicherheitneudenken.de/zivile-sicherheit-ist-wirksam/chenoweth-studie/>

³⁷ However, the UN Charter, like the Charter of Paris, is increasingly interpreted differently by China and Russia as well as by many other states than by Western states. We need a new European and global dialogue to the common Interpretation of the foundations of our worldwide coexistence agreed in 1945 and 1990, see "Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on some issues of global governance under current conditions" of March 24, 2021, <https://russische-botschaft.ru/de/2021/03/24/gemeinsame-erklaerung-der-aussenminister-der-volksrepublik-china-und-der-russischen-foederation-zu-einigen-fragen-der-global-governance-unter-aktuellen-bedingungen/>

³⁸ see "How effective are sanctions?", tagesschau.de, February 23, 2022, <https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/eu-ropa/sanktionen-wirksamkeit-russland-101.html>, „Sanction against Russia - is the bond ban missing its goal?“, tagesschau.de, February 28, 2022, <https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/finanzen/warum-das-anleihenverbot-russland-kaum-trifft-101.html> as well as Urs P. Gasche, „Nothing, but nothing at all, justifies the war of aggression“, infosperber, February 26, 2022, <https://www.infosperber.ch/politik/nichts-aber-auch-gar-nichts-rechtfertigt-den-angriff-skrieg/>.

According to the Federal Intelligence Service BND, as of March 4, 2022 there is no evidence that the Russian war of aggression endangers Putin's power and influence.

"It is to be expected, it is said in security circles, that ultimately the capital Kiev will be taken. When this will happen is unclear. This could be preceded by a prolonged military encirclement and siege of the city, with catastrophic consequences for the population and with a collapse of the supply of drinking water, food and electricity."³⁹

There is no alternative to dialogue and cooperation - especially now.

We observe with hope that negotiations between Russia and Ukraine have begun.

We hear substantive proposals from both sides: a fundamental offer of neutrality from Kiev and a fundamental willingness to withdraw from Moscow. We support this.

In our view, NATO should now actively support Kiev's offer of neutrality on the condition of international security guarantees. That would be helpful for an immediate end to the fighting.

Of course, under the UN Charter, Ukraine has a clear right to military self-defense. And, of course, Vladimir Putin's war of aggression not only violates international law codified in the UN Charter, but also betrays the security guarantees promised to Ukraine for relinquishing its nuclear weapons in the Budapest Memorandum of 1994⁴⁰ (*although Ukraine never had actual control over the nuclear weapons stationed on its territory*).

But in view of Vladimir Putin's increasing unpredictability and unscrupulousness, negotiation offers by the EU and NATO as well as Ukraine, some of which address Vladimir Putin's terms, are urgently needed in addition to non-military sanctions.

According to conventional security-logical understanding, this absolutely necessary first step towards de-escalation is extremely difficult because it conveys the impression of giving in to Russia's violence and thus having lost the showdown.

Nevertheless, there is no reasonable alternative. The present constellation is also the result of our failure to build a resilient peace order since 1990. The West, which emerged as the winner of the Cold War, does not bear sole responsibility for this, but shares responsibility in



"President Putin wants recognition, and he wants to belong to the powerful on the world stage.

And I perceive an attitude in the West – this is also something that President Obama said – that Russia is a regional power. I think that's very hurtful to him.

If the West manages to respond to this aspect and say that we are sticking to our borders, sovereignty of states is inviolable, and at the same time we are trying to respond to this point, if Macron or von der Leyen were to say something like 'Russia plays a role in solving all the major global crisis', then I could imagine that this opens up room for negotiation."⁸⁵

Julia Weigelt, freelance journalist, ARD-Presseclub
March 6, 2022

³⁹ „How far is Putin's military going?“, tagesschau.de, March 4, 2022, <https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/wdr/bnd-russland-ukraine-krieg-101.html>

⁴⁰ see https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapester_Memorandum

⁸⁵ see <https://www.ardmediathek.de/video/presseclub/krieg-in-der-ukraine-angst-in-deutschland/das-erste/Y3JpZDovL3dkci5kZS9CZWl0cmFnLTlxZmVmZjRkLTQxZGI0NGUwMMS1hOGI4LWI3NzhkNTFiYTtyYw>

depriving Russia of equal participation in a pan-European reorganization firmly agreed in 1990.

This is confirmed by none other than US diplomat George Kennan, who is regarded as the originator of the containment policy pursued by the USA since 1947 during the Cold War to contain Soviet imperialism.⁴¹

NATO should not repeat the mistake of 2001 when, in the face of the terrible terrorist attacks in New York, we went to war in Afghanistan without any real strategy – which, as is well known, ended in disaster 20 years later.

To fuel the war in Ukraine now without a conscious strategy seems at least unwise and extremely risky in view of President Putin's unpredictability.

Could it be that with NATO's eastward enlargement we have repeated the mistake of the victorious powers of the First World War to humiliate a former world power?

NATO's eastward expansion after the collapse of the Soviet Union is perceived as exactly such a humiliation from the point of view of Russia, its President and the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, Cyril.⁴²

Regardless of this, of course, the call on President Vladimir Putin to immediately stop his war of aggression in violation of international law applies. To wait for this, however, would be fatal. The situation is far too explosive for that, given the dangers posed by potential damage to the nuclear power plants in Ukraine and the possible use of nuclear weapons.⁴³

Both NATO and Russia have contributed to the escalation. Both can therefore also contribute to de-escalation. To do this, however, they must abandon the path of military security logic in favor of peace-logical conflict transformation.⁴⁴



"NATO should actively approach Russia and work towards a de-escalation of the situation. To this end, a meeting without preconditions at the highest level should not be ruled out."

Prof. Dr. Johannes Varwick on December 5, 2021 (Call for the improvement of relations with Russia)⁸⁶

⁴¹ George Kennan, A Fateful Error, New York Times, February 5, 1997, <https://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/05/opinion/a-fateful-error.html>

⁴² Response of Patriarch Kirill to the World Council of Churches March 10, 2022, <https://www.oikoumene.org/resources/documents/response-by-hh-patriarch-kirill-of-moscow-to-rev-prof-dr-ioan-sauca-english-translation>

⁴³ the last passages are largely taken verbatim from the statement by the Peace Logic Working Group of the Platform for Civil Conflict Management "For consistent peace-logical action in the Ukraine conflict" of February 17, 2022, https://pzkb.de/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Stellungnahme_Fu%CC%88r-konsequent-friedenslogisches-Handeln_Ukraine.pdf

⁴⁴ see <https://pzkb.de/publikationen/aktualisierte-fassung-friedenslogik-weiterdenken-dialoge-friedensarbeit-politik-infolyer/>

⁸⁶ Call "Exit the escalation spiral! For a new beginning in relations to Russia", December 5, 2021, <https://www.gsp-sipo.de/news/news-details/aufruf-zur-verbesserung-der-beziehungen-zu-russland>

The EU's de-escalating options

The massive economic sanctions imposed by the US and the EU are a relatively non-violent form of reaction to the Russian war of aggression – as dubious and ambivalent as they are in their effect.⁴⁵

Like NATO, the EU could clearly signal its support to Russia for negotiations on Ukraine's future neutrality with international security guarantees, in line with President Zelenskyi's offer.⁴⁶

In addition, the EU could signal to President Putin that in the upcoming negotiations with Ukraine on its closer economic ties to the EU, similar to Brexit for Northern Ireland, the possibility of simultaneous preferential economic relations with the Eurasian Economic Union EAEU will be created.

In addition, the EU could propose to Russia the start of negotiations on President Putin's wish for a single EU/EAEU economic area from the Atlantic to the Pacific, last publicly expressed on June 22, 2021.⁴⁷

The EU's attempt to push Ukraine to make an alternative decision between the EU and the EAEU in 2013 was one of the key reasons for the violent escalation of conflicts in 2014.⁴⁸

The option of international mediation

As of March 11, there have been several attempts at international mediation. Among others, Israel conducted talks and the foreign ministers of Russia and Ukraine met in Ankara for negotiations for the first time since the beginning of the war. China offered mediation on the basis of



"The NATO states must ask themselves self-critically whether the course taken after the end of the Cold War ... was right, where NATO enlargement finds its limits and how the sustainable integration of Russia into the European security system should be ensured.

In order to safeguard our interests, we need a realpolitik approach and the courage to say goodbye to cherished stereotypical patterns of argumentation and to seek a balance of interests with Russia in cool and rational calculation and with firmness."

Former Ambassador
Rüdiger Lüdeking in Cicero
on January 22, 2022⁸⁷

⁴⁵ see Tobias Dammers, How effective are sanctions?, tagesschau.de, February 23, 2022, <https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/europa/sanktionen-wirksamkeit-russland-101.html>

⁴⁶ see <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/absage-an-gebietsabtrennungen-selenskyj-offenbar-bereit-ueber-neutralitaet-der-ukraine-zu-verhandeln/28140644.html>

⁴⁷ see Vladimir Putin, Be open, despite the past, Die ZEIT, June 22, 2021, <https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2021-06/ueberfall-auf-die-sowjetunion-1941-europa-russland-geschichte-wladimir-putin/komplettansicht> - see also reporting on tagesschau.de: <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/gedenken-ueberfall-sowjetunion-101.html>

⁴⁸ The then President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, declared in February 2013 with regard to a possible customs union between Ukraine and Russia that a country could not be a member of a customs union and at the same time in a far-reaching free trade area with the EU. Ukraine must decide which path it wants to take. See <https://www.derstandard.at/story/1361241226412/eu-stellt-ukraine-vor-die-wahl> and ARTE, With Open Cards, Ukraine Special, March 5, 2022, <https://www.arte.tv/de/videos/108166-001-A/mit-offenen-karten/>

⁸⁷ Ambassador a.D. Rüdiger Lüdeking, Appeasement does not have to be a mistake, Cicero, January 22, 2022, <https://www.cicero.de/aussenpolitik/konflikt-ukraine-appeasement-muss-kein-fehler-sein-luedeking>

the UN Charter and taking into account the security interests of all parties involved.

Mediation initiatives by the UN Secretary-General or the Pope are also conceivable.



The option of active civil resistance

On March 14, 2022, an employee of Russian state television put up civil resistance in an extremely courageous and effective way to President Putin's war in Ukraine, which was carried by lies in the state-controlled media: She interrupted the main news program with loud shouts and a poster against the Ukraine war.⁴⁹

This is an impressive example of effective civil resistance that is possible through the courage of one's convictions. If such actions are flexibly and professionally coordinated across the board, according to scientific findings they are as effective as violent resistance.⁵⁰

We also see pictures of civil nonviolent resistance in Ukraine these days. Unarmed people face tanks and other military vehicles and redirect street signs to mislead Russian soldiers.

There are videos circulating of Ukrainians offering to tow Russian soldiers stranded without gasoline to Moscow, and pictures of Russian deserters being greeted with tea and cheers.^{51,52}

A representative nationwide survey conducted by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in 2015 on the option of active civil resistance shows Ukrainians' preference at the time for civil resistance in the event of a foreign armed invasion and occupation of their country.⁵³

The poll took place shortly after the Euromaidan revolution and the capture of Crimea, as well as Russian troops' support for separatists in the Donbass region, when one could expect the Ukrainian public to support the defense of the motherland by force of arms.

Nonetheless, the results instead showed surprisingly strong support for active nonviolent defense under civilian leadership.

"It is dialogues and negotiations that lead to agreements on necessary crisis solutions and contracts. As trade unions, we know the value of dialogue and negotiation. We have concluded over 32,000 collective agreements in the last 20 years. And only negotiations lead to security, conflict resolution and peace."

Andrea Kocsis, Deputy Chairwoman of ver.di⁸⁸

⁴⁹ see <https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/russland-protest-staatsfernsehen-101.html>

⁵⁰ see „Why civil resistance works“, 2011 und 2019, <https://www.sicherheitneudenken.de/zivile-sicherheit-ist-wirksam/chenoweth-studie/> as well as Benjamin Isaak-Krauß, The Power of Nonviolent Resistance, The Owl, March 10, 2022, <https://eulemagazin.de/die-macht-gewaltlosen-widerstands/>

⁵¹ see <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-tank-fuel-russia-kyiv-b2024003.html>

⁵² <https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/russian-soldier-breaks-down-tears-26372773>

⁵³ https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/blog_post/ukrainians-vs-putin-potential-for-nonviolent-civilianbased-defense/

⁸⁸ see <https://www.sicherheitneudenken.de/mach-mit/prominente-unterstuetzer/prominente/>

The survey found that the most popular form of resistance among Ukrainians was non-violent resistance: 29% supported this option in the event of armed foreign aggression and 26% in the event of occupation.

These results conform with the historical record of battles against occupiers:

Scientific data on several hundred protest movements of the 20th century with maximum goals (end of an occupation, independence of a territory or change of ruler) show that active nonviolent resistance against military occupations is just as often a full success as violent resistance.

The partial success rate of non-violent resistance is even four times higher than for violent resistance, the failure rate of which is twice as high.⁵⁴

Armed resistance lasts on average three times as long as its non-violent counterparts, entails enormous human and infrastructural costs for the population, and regularly destroys or traumatizes civil society.

In contrast, active nonviolent resistance can historically lead to success much faster than armed struggle; even if nonviolent resistance fails, the structure of civil society remains more effective in order to resume the struggle on a later day.

In addition, active nonviolent resistance preserves the personal integrity of those involved in a much more sustainable way, whereas violent resistance significantly endangers it.

According to the study, the following three factors contribute decisively to this potential for the success of civil resistance:

1. Broad participation of various groups,
2. Changing tactics that build up pressure while minimizing repression,
3. Shifts in loyalty within important pillars of the opponent's power.

Ukrainians were also asked to choose certain types of armed and nonviolent resistance actions that they would join or carry out themselves.

Clear majorities opted for various non-violent methods of resistance – from symbolic to disruptive to constructive resistance actions against an occupier – and not for violent insurgent actions. Essentially, the results showed that Ukrainians' human capital for civilian nonviolent defense was more than three times that for armed resistance.

Successful anti-occupation struggles have always been a national undertaking. Unarmed resistance has a greater mobilization potential for



"Here you are being lied to!"

Marina Ovsyanikova on March 14, 2022 in the main news program of Russian state television⁴⁹

⁵⁴ see <https://www.sicherheitneudenken.de/zivile-sicherheit-ist-wirksam/chenoweth-studie/>

an entire society that can participate in various actions of defiance and non-cooperation than armed resistance.

Contrary to what is often claimed, the goal of nonviolent resistance is not to arouse the compassion of dictators or to persuade oppressors to repent. Rather, active nonviolent resistance is aimed at weakening the power of the opponent so that he can no longer cause damage.

To do this, one analyses on which pillars the opponent's power rests, identifies weak points and develops strategies to exploit them and bring down certain pillars. Active nonviolent resistance specifically seeks to limit access to resources, exacerbate internal conflicts, or persuade individual groups to engage in overt or covert non-cooperation.⁵⁵

Ukrainians show a surprising level of support for the kind of resistance that neither Ukrainian politicians nor their Western supporters have considered in their defense planning: nonviolent mass resistance against a formidable military aggressor.

The way Ukrainians defend their country against a militarily stronger adversary will determine Ukraine's future, including the survival of democracy. A protracted armed struggle often privileges a strong man to the detriment of democratic development.

Interestingly, today there are efforts in the Baltic States to integrate a comprehensive nonviolent civil defense. This is highlighted in the specific recommendations for nonviolent defense strategies presented by a respected U.S. security think tank.⁵⁶

Lithuania took a pioneering role in these implementation efforts when, in 2016, the government adopted a new military strategy for "reliable deterrence, which requires the preparation of citizens for unarmed active civilian resistance, [including] the promotion of their will and resilience to information attacks, as well as their ability to resist total resistance ... on the part of the whole nation".

The Lithuanian Ministry of Defence has published two manuals on the "Forms and Principles of Civil Resistance" in the context of national defence.⁵⁷ Those in power like President Putin fear the diversity of democratic civil society the most. What can deter military interventions is a resilient, democratic and resistance-experienced society and the breaking of the chains of obedience that support it.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ see Benjamin Isaak-Krauß, The Power of Nonviolent Resistance, The Owl, March 10, 2022, <https://eulemagazin.de/die-macht-gewaltlosen-widerstands/> as well as Gene Sharp, From dictatorship to democracy, <https://www.sicherheitneudenken.de/media/download/variant/272969/gene-sharp-von-der-diktatur-zur-demokratie.pdf>

⁵⁶ said

⁵⁷ see https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/blog_post/ukrainians-vs-putin-potential-for-nonviolent-civilian-based-defense/

⁵⁸ A US study of 16,000 mass protests proves that these are becoming better and better organised, are more successful and less violent, <https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/amerika/studie-massenproteste-101.html>

7

The perspective of a European Peace and Security Order

This makes it all the more important to develop a perspective that can resolve the conflicting interests of Vladimir Putin and Ukraine at a higher level.

We should take the fact seriously that NATO's eastward expansion is seen in Russia as a humiliating insult, as President Putin has repeatedly said since 2001. Of course, it also offended Russia that the Soviet Union dissolved after 1989. Part of a responsible policy is to take this insult seriously.

How liberating was the vision of a common peace and security architecture for East and West in 1990, which was to be built under the umbrella of the OSCE (at that time still CSCE). It would have been responsible to put into practice the trust that existed on all sides in 1990 in such a common institutional framework.

Peace requires an institutional framework that limits violence. It would therefore have been responsible to involve Russia in a common peace and security order as early as 1990. In this respect, it is a myth to believe that we already built a sustainable pacifying European Security Order after 1990.⁵⁹

There are several reasons why we did not do so. Essential to the – possibly rapid – pacification of Ukraine and Russia would now be NATO's clear offer to renounce further NATO eastward expansion in favor of negotiating and building a common European peace and security architecture under the umbrella of the OSCE that would pacify all sides.

For de-escalation in the current war, it is necessary not to read the Paris Charter of 1990 and the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 selectively, but to interpret their individual passages in the context of each other.

In the conflict over Ukraine, a selective reading of both agreements has so far dominated on both sides. While NATO emphasises those passages that confirm that all states have a free choice of their security policy dispositions, the Russian side focuses on those formulations that amount to a common and undivided security.



"Perhaps diplomacy did not work optimally here in the following years. Otherwise we wouldn't have this war now."

Gertmann Sude, former General of the Bundeswehr, WLZ on March 5, 2022⁸⁹



"It's about designing a new security architecture in Europe that guarantees stability and peace."

Dr. Martina Fischer, Peace Officer of Brot für die Welt, on February 9, 2022 in ZDF heute-Interview⁹⁰

⁵⁹ see Sabine Jaberg, Myth "Russia has terminated the European peace order.", Opening papers on common myths in the security and peace policy of the [Working Group of the Study Group on European Security and Peace](https://sicherheitneudenken.eki-musterhausen.de/html/media/dl.html?v=186698) the Association of German Scientists, <https://sicherheitneudenken.eki-musterhausen.de/html/media/dl.html?v=186698>

⁸⁹ see <https://www.wlz-online.de/waldeck/voehl/diplomatie-gefragt-wie-nie-91389341.html>

⁹⁰ see <https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/russland-nato-ukraine-konflikt-diplomatie-100.html>

The Berlin Memorandum from 2017 describes how security policy cooperation can also succeed between democracies and autocracies, i.e. between different value systems.⁶⁰

It is now up to our Federal Government, the EU and NATO to make the OSCE the decisive place where the basic architecture of a pan-European peace and security order capable of constructive conflict transformation is negotiated without preconditions in conjunction with both principles, which corrects the mistakes and heals the wounds of the past.

This includes the recognition of the violations of international law in Europe by both sides (NATO: former Yugoslavia, Russia: Crimea and eastern Ukraine), a new commitment to international law and the long-term overcoming of NATO. Ukraine could ideally function as a neutral bridge state between Western and Eastern Europe - with Kiev as the seat of the OSCE.⁶¹

A policy that makes one's own understanding of universally valid standards the guiding maxim and tries to assert itself against criticism from authoritarian notions of order does not contribute to the end of the war, but exacerbates the existing conflicts.

The willingness to acknowledge, endure and ultimately deal constructively with such normative differences is one of the fundamental requirements for a pan-European order. The sustainability of democratic, constitutional and human rights values is also demonstrated by the extent to which they allow the peaceful and constructive resolution of security policy conflicts with the normative other and dispense with ideological confrontations.⁶²

Of course, a sustainable peace order in Europe also includes reparation payments from Russia to Ukraine as well as the punishment of war crimes and extensive processing of traumas on all sides.



"It's about developing a way of thinking that makes it possible to create peace, that is, to enable relationships in which violence becomes unlikely because cooperation succeeds."⁹¹

Prof. Dr. Hanne-Margret Birckenbach, FFE 2016

8

Focus on the reception of refugees

We support the solidarity commitment of our population and EU governments to refugees from Ukraine as well as humanitarian aid for war

⁶⁰ Ines-Jacqueline Werkner et al., Berlin Memorandum "Rethinking Security – Paths of Peace in Europe", 2017, http://fest-heidelberg.de/images/publikation/Werkner_et_al_2017_Berliner_Memorandum_Sicherheit_neu_denken_-_Wege_des_Friedens_in_Europa.pdf

⁶¹ cf. Michael von der Schulenburg, In Ukraine, the foundation for a new pan-European peace order could be laid, Wall Street International Magazine, February 1, 2022, <https://wsimag.com/de/wirtschaft-und-politik/68460-der-jetzig-ukraine-konflikt>

⁶² said

⁹¹ Hanne-Margret Birckenbach, From Security Logic to Peace Logic, FFE Newsletter 2016 p. 3–8

victims - regardless of skin colour, nationality and identity and without racist rejection.

Our solidarity also reaches out to the people who are raising their voices against the war in Moscow, Saint Petersburg and so many other cities in Russia. We are deeply impressed by their strength and courage.

As an initiative, we support the civil resistance in Russia. The open letter from over 7,000 scientists and around 700 mathematicians calling on President Putin to end the war has revealed the tremendous courage with which people from the civilian population in Russia are protesting against their government's war.⁶³

More than 17,000 Russian doctors and health workers strongly oppose the Russian military intervention in Ukraine in an open letter and demand the immediate cessation of all acts of war in accordance with their medical oath and a humane and equal treatment of all lives.⁶⁴

The EU should grant asylum to soldiers and conscientious objectors from Russia, Belarus and Ukraine.⁶⁵

Exchange programmes for students, town twinning and other forms of civil society, scientific, ecclesiastical and artistic networking that enable personal cross-cultural encounters should be continued.

9

Focus on the “turning point”

(Complete article by Dr. Corinna Hauswedell from the magazine W&F)⁶⁶

Since the Federal Chancellor's government statement to the Bundestag on 27 February 2022, the term "turning point" has been used to establish a comprehensive reorientation of German foreign and security policy. There is talk of a great "paradigm shift". To many, this seems plausible in view of the illegal war that Putin is waging against Ukraine, or even imperative. But it also leaves many of us at a loss and raises new questions.

The dispatch of 1,000 anti-tank weapons and 500 surface-to-air missiles of the "Stinger" type to Ukraine was a U-turn – perhaps understandable

⁶³ see <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/wissen/tausende-unterschriften-fuer-den-frieden-zwei-offene-briefe-russischer-forscher-gegen-putin/28131602.html>

⁶⁴ see <https://www.ippnw.de/frieden/konflikte-kriege/ukraine/artikel/de/offener-brief-russischer-aerztinnen.html>

⁶⁵ see EKD Peace Commissioner and Peace Associations, Grant Conscientious Objectors and Deserters from Ukraine, Russia and Belarus Protection and Asylum, 16.03.2022, <https://de.connection-ev.org/article-3504>

⁶⁶ This chapter is quoted verbatim from Dr. Corinna Hauswedell, Turning point?, W&F, <https://wissenschaft-und-frieden.de/blog/meinungen-und-positionen/zeitenwende/>

under the impression of the terrible events – compared to the previously undoubtedly correct renunciation of arms deliveries. This renunciation was well founded in German history, which did not pass overnight. Currently, this paradigm of refraining from supplying weapons to "hot conflicts" was also due to the fact that Germany could rightly fear that weapons would make it even more of a party to the conflict and thus close possible mediation doors.

Everything obsolete? Other smaller States of Europe and civil societies will have to jump into the gap that has now arisen for the urgently needed, renewed dialogue with Russia. However, the more far-reaching decisions, the ones for a hitherto unthinkable build-up and equipping of the German military by means of a constitutionally guaranteed (and thus binding for future governments) special fund of € 100 billion, are neither sufficiently justified nor discussed in the parliamentary groups of the Bundestag, let alone in the German public.

This feeds the concern that the Chancellery and the Foreign Ministry are throwing important lessons from conflict history and analysis overboard in the wake of the war, that the course for a more peaceful future will be set here without a sufficient strategic compass. All too easily, the foreign policy paradigms of the past decades – at least with regard to Russia policy – are now characterised as "illusory", "naïve" or even "mendacious" (Tobias Rapp, Spiegel 9/22, p.23.). This not only thrusts aside history, but also discredits scientifically based peace and security policy, as it had developed from the bitter lessons of the world wars and the Cold War.

The political scientist Herfried Münkler, for example, calls for a radical rethink: He now sees the end of a policy based on the perception of mutual interests and confidence building; times of "generalised mistrust" are emerging, confrontation will take the place of cooperation – the "end of diplomacy" has come (DLF February 28, 2022); it is important to say goodbye to "win-win" thinking - which many have considered necessary in view of the global challenges of the 21st century - also for good reasons between states and societies of different values and political systems.

So everything wrong, everything put to the test?

Scholz's statement that "not all threats of the future can be contained with the means of the Bundeswehr" is not a slip of the tongue. "Not all..."? Very few threats, above all climate change and scarcity of resources, pandemics, even cyber conflicts or terrorism, can be effectively dealt with by military means! Unfortunately, this is shown by most recent experiences with the civil-military use of so-called "networked security". Military intervention, whether through troop deployment or



"This feeds the concern that the Chancellery and the Foreign Ministry are throwing important lessons from conflict history and analysis overboard in the wake of the war, that the course for a more peaceful future will be set here without a sufficient strategic compass."

Dr. Corinna Hauswedell, historian and peace and conflict researcher, co-editor of the annual peace report between 2000 and 2017, in the journal *Wissenschaft & Frieden*⁶⁴

arms deliveries, even if this was done with a "stabilising" or "deterrent" intention, has had an escalating and not security-building effect in almost all the cases examined (eg. in Afghanistan or Mali); and unfortunately, civilian interventions with the aim of political, economic or humanitarian stabilisation have often been thwarted by military action.

The fear of an imminent escalation of the war we are now experiencing is real and justified, and drives most of us. But fear is a bad guide for exit strategies. The use of military force almost always develops a dangerous momentum of its own, the urge to escalate is related to the martial "nature" of the weapons and the irrationalisms of those who use them. But how to stop the unpredictable?

With the view that Putin wants to go back to the 19th century with his "imperialism", rogue state action is outsourced to the past, as if there were no comparable power and power politics in the present. The causes of a renaissance of nationalisms, as we are currently experiencing in many of our modern societies, are multivalent and can promote authoritarian state structures. They arise from today's eco-social upheavals, and unfortunately military-based great power aspirations are not alien to the liberal democracies of the 20th and 21st centuries. The immensely high military budgets and the associated strategies of the major NATO states (including nuclear strategies), above all the USA, speak for themselves.

A new realpolitik, as it is now becoming apparent in Berlin, would therefore be well advised not to apply double standards when it comes to the peaceful solution of the future tasks that we all face. The division of the world into good and evil, which the Putin war seems to suggest again, was last seen in the 1980s, the final phase of the Cold War, and again after the attacks of September 11, 2001 with the "War on Terror": with the well-known consequences of international enmity, which threatens to obscure the idea that security on our planet will only be shared and not developed against each other.

Such extensive hostility is a fatal development in the age of new geopolitics, in which China is emerging as an important player. Without finally winning Russia back onto the world stage as a constructive actor, it will not work. A look at Siberia, where uninhibited global warming will promote the thawing of permafrost and the release of unimagined amounts of greenhouse gases and thus threaten the entire planet, should suffice.

The central messages of Olaf Scholz's government declaration of 27 February 2022 must therefore be addressed in three ways: Are they viable in terms of

- a de-escalation of the acute war situation,



"I believe that the increase in Germany's military spending is first and foremost an attempt to show that it is politically capable of acting in the war.

After the war, we will have to think again.

Then the question will be what a future international order can look like. It's about much more than armaments and the military.

It is about a binding international legal order to the point where it is finally clear that political actors who commit war crimes and crimes against humanity will be held accountable before the International Criminal Court."

Jochen Cornelius-Bundschuh, Bishop of the Evangelical Church in Baden on March 11, 2022⁹²

⁹² see <https://www.evangelisch.de/inhalte/198300/11-03-2022/krieg-moeglichst-schnell-stoppen>

- the creation of new conditions for a European peace order,
- and a German contribution to a just international climate policy of the future?

According to the arguments put forward, serious doubts are warranted with regard to the first two questions.

The third question is closely related to the first two: Such a course, which heralds the "turning point" with a new wave of rearmament and militarisation, will certainly not provide enough resources or special funds, neither ideally nor materially, to make the immense strategic-conceptual and financial investments that we need for the restructuring of a sustainable and socially just economic and social order.

Knowing-it-all is certainly out of place at the moment. Too much is uncertain. But serious concerns deriving from the knowledge of the eventful history of conflict in our country should be allowed.



"It is basically militaristic thinking that led to the war in Ukraine. A highly armed Russia that felt provoked by militarization on the other side." ⁹³

Kristina Lunz, Frankfurter Rundschau, March 8, 2022

10

Focus on budget consultations

With the announcement in the German Bundestag on February 27, 2022 of a one-off special fund for the Bundeswehr in the amount of 100 billion euros and future annual defence expenditure amounting to over 2% of our GDP, Olaf Scholz is trying to realign German foreign and security policy, which is flawed with regard to the establishment of a European Peace and Security Order including Russia and Ukraine agreed in 1990.

Already in our positive scenario published in 2018, further increases in the Bundeswehr budget by 2025 were expected when the concept was written. Given the current war, these increases are now likely to be higher and longer than anticipated.⁶⁷

A fundamental trend reversal with much stronger investments in climate and health protection, in sustainable (energy) partnerships with the states of Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe as well as in civilian crisis prevention and intervention and civil defence remains possible, provided that we see the current crisis as an opportunity and the

⁶⁷ see Ralf Becker, Stefan Maaß & Christoph Schneider-Harpprecht [Eds.], Rethinking Security - From Military to Civilian Security Policy, 2018, https://www.sicherheitneudenken.de/media/download/variant/261672/d---friedensszenario_2021_auf1-3_lang_komplett.pdf, p. 142

⁹³ Kristina Lunz in an interview with Frankfurter Rundschau, March 8, 2022, <https://www.fr.de/politik/kristina-lunz-feministische-aussenpolitik-frieden-centreforfeministforeignpolicy-ich-werde-als-dumm-und-naiv-beschimpft-91394203.html>

paradigm shift from military to civilian, from a competing to a common security policy.

We need more investments in civilian conflict resolution and structures that strengthen and sustain peace in the long term.

To this end, under the current conditions, our initiative is striving for a development and expansion plan for instruments of civilian crisis prevention / civil security policy and democracy promotion as well as corresponding accompanying public relations, which is expressly mentioned in the coalition agreement.

In numerous discussions already held and planned with members of the Bundestag and members of the government, we hope to be able to achieve significant increases in the budget estimates for instruments of civil security and peace policy in as early as the 2022 federal budget (in civilian crisis prevention and intervention, civil peace service, mediation, international development cooperation, humanitarian aid, diplomacy and civil defence).

This also includes increased funding and contributions for the OSCE and the UN, as well as the development of permanently available intercultural and organisational development experience for international police missions.

There is also a need for increased public relations work on instruments of civil security policy in Germany (in a federal funding program "100 educational promoters for civil defense, crisis prevention and intervention as well as constructive conflict management").

In addition, together with the Platform for Civil Conflict Management, we are committed to the development and expansion of instruments and structures for dealing with social conflicts and the anchoring of a constructive conflict culture in the broad spectrum of our society.⁶⁸

An increase in the Bundeswehr budget (including the planned special fund) this year to over 70 billion euros would be 3,500 (!) times as much as the budget of the mediation department in the Federal Foreign Office, which has been extremely effective in peace worldwide (annual budget: only 20 million euros for 40 (!) internationally successful mediation projects) - and 1,300 (!) times as much as that of the Civil Peace Service, which is also effective worldwide (according to the Federal Government after a three-year evaluation).



"If Germany wants to assume more responsibility in the world, then this also entails increasing funds for development policy, humanitarian aid, civilian crisis prevention and diplomacy. According to the coalition agreement, all this is linked to an increase in the military budget."

Sven-Christian Kindler, budget policy spokesman of the Green parliamentary group in the Bundestag on March 3, 2022 opposite the ARD capital studio⁹⁴

⁶⁸ see position paper "Democracy needs a constructive approach to conflicts" of the Platform for Civil Conflict Management (www.pzkb.de) of June 2020, <https://pzkb.de/positionspapier-demokratie-braucht-den-konstruktiven-umgang-mit-konflikten/>

⁹⁴ see <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/gruene-krieg-101.html>

In recent years, we have already held talks in this regard with over 70 members and candidates of the Bundestag, including the foreign policy spokesman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group at that time, Roderich Kiesewetter, and the defence politicians of the Parliamentary Group of the Left Party.

In the last weeks and months of the escalation of the Ukraine crisis, we exchanged views in background talks with coalition negotiators of the SPD and B90/The Greens, including the current party chairman of B90/Die Grünen, Omid Nouripour, and the foreign policy spokesman of the SPD parliamentary group, Dr. Nils Schmid.

In March 2022, we had talks with Katja Keul (State Secretary at the Federal Foreign Office), Ulrich Lechte (Foreign Policy Spokesman of the FDP parliamentary group) and Sara Nanni (Security Policy Spokesperson of the Green Parliamentary Group).

Further talks have been agreed with Tobias Lindner (State Secretary at the Federal Foreign Office), Agnieszka Brugger (Deputy Parliamentary Group Chairwoman B90/The Greens, Chairwoman of the Parliamentary Group Working Group for Europe, Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Development Policy, Security and Peace Policy, Civilian Crisis Prevention and Disarmament), Rolf Mützenich (Chairman of the SPD Parliamentary Group) and various other Members of the Bundestag.

Through the combination of numerous discussions with leading politicians in Berlin and the simultaneous visit of numerous deputies in their constituencies by our local initiatives and multipliers, we believe we can achieve the necessary dynamics.

The planned campaign period is between the government draft for the 2022 federal budget and the financial plan until 2025 adopted on March 16 and their passing a few weeks later.

A first budget politician of the government coalition has already signaled support and invited us to Berlin for appropriate talks.

11

Focus on the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

The war in Ukraine is indeed proof of the fragility of a non-rules-based world order, an order dominated by the law of the strongest.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ see Tilman Brück, Ist Pazifismus noch zeitgemäß?, Deutschlandfunkkultur March 4, 2022, <https://www.deutschland-funkkultur.de/krieg-ukraine-pazifismus-noch-zeitgemaess-100.html>

The nuclear strikes threatened by President Putin are unacceptable and would have devastating humanitarian consequences. Only recently, Russia, together with the four nuclear-weapon states USA, Great Britain, France and China, declared that nuclear wars cannot be won.

President Putin can behave as he does because he has nuclear weapons. And he could invade Ukraine because in 1994 it renounced nuclear weapons in reliance on security guarantees from Russia, the US and Great Britain.

In the current world, all states are thus learning that they should strive for nuclear weapons, that otherwise they are at the mercy of the power of nuclear powers. The nuclear-weapon states have long ceased fulfilling their obligation to disarm their nuclear weapons, which they agreed to do in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.⁷⁰

Adherence to the concept of nuclear deterrence leads to a security dilemma and thus to an arms race. Therefore, it is only a matter of time before nuclear weapons could be used if we do not abandon the unsubstantiated myth of "security through nuclear deterrence."⁷¹

There is no alternative to the Global Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which entered into force on January 22, 2021, for shaping a responsible future based on the strength of the law instead of the law of strength. Accordingly, we also need further reforms of the UN Security Council.

With its brutal breach of international law and the beginning of its invasion of Ukraine precisely during the UN Security Council meeting, Russia forfeited its moral right to a veto seat on the UN Security Council. The right of a veto in the UN Security Council should finally be abolished.

Accordingly, it is time to democratize the entire UN.⁷²



"Now it is urgent to remember that nuclear weapons do not secure peace. That is why we urgently need to talk about arms control in the future, and also about complete global nuclear disarmament."

Ulrich Kühn, Head of the Research Department Arms Control and New Technologies at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg on March 5, 2022 in the taz⁹⁵

⁷⁰ see <https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomwaffensperrvertrag>

⁷¹ see https://www.icanw.de/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Impulse_fuer_ein_atomwaffenfreies_Deutschland_August_2021.pdf, p. 38

⁷² see Klaus Moegling, A new world order is (still) possible, 2020, <https://www.klaus-moegling.de/aktuelle-auflage-neuordnung/>

⁹⁵ see <https://taz.de/Waffenexperte-ueber-Russlands-Aggression/!5838971/>

12

Focus overcoming the climate crisis

It is widely known that we can only tackle the climate crisis, which threatens the existence of our security and lives worldwide, together with Russia.

From this side, too, there is an urgent need to end the current war in Ukraine, even with the temporary renunciation of Ukraine's right to sovereignty. Solving the climate crisis is more important than seemingly losing the current showdown between Vladimir Putin and NATO.

In view of the already 16-fold superiority of the NATO states in military spending compared to Russia, we can all gain much more than lose by giving way militarily in the current Ukraine war and concerning President Putin's demands.



"Ecological energy cooperation with Russia is of the utmost importance in terms of peace policy. It is in Europe's interest to help Russia get out of its economy's dependence on fossil fuels. Otherwise, there would be no chance of achieving the Paris climate goals."

Andreas Zumach, independent journalist, at the 9th Rhenish Peace Conference on March 2, 2022⁹⁶

⁹⁶ see <https://ev-akademie-rheinland.ekir.de/inhalt/rueckblick-auf-die-9-rheinische-friedenskonferenz/>

Rethinking Security Report 2022

Our 50-page report "Turning the Perspective - Overcoming Helplessness", published on the Munich Security Conference on February 18, 2022, is still relevant in numerous respects and is recommended to all interested parties.⁷³

Peace for Future

Not least because of the current war in Ukraine, we are experiencing a high level of interest in our Peace for Future network and its peace mentor training.⁷⁴⁷⁵

For this pilot project in cooperation with the Protestant Church in Essen, there are almost three times as many registrations as slots long before the registration deadline.

Over the next two years, we want to greatly expand this project, which is backed up by the supporting organizations of our initiative, numerous private donors, the Church Relief Organization Misereor and the Foundation Kraft der Gewaltfreiheit in line with the increasing demand nationwide.⁷⁶⁷⁷⁷⁸

After two years of pandemic experience and in view of the current danger of world war, young people are currently experiencing a third traumatizing experience with the Ukraine war and the associated existential insecurity.

With the training as a peace mentor, we offer them a safe space in which they can exchange ideas with each other in an open and well-kept atmosphere and overcome powerlessness, anger and despair.

The training provides access to conflict behaviour in the personal sphere (from domestic/family conflicts to dealing with domestic sexual violence), school, training and companies in order to be able to act in these areas in a conflict-sensitive manner.

The training also enables people to transfer what they have experienced and understood in personal conflict behaviour to social,



I think the Rethinking Security initiative is very important and I particularly support working with young people on the topics of peace and security."

Aeham Ahmad, pianist from the ruins of Damascus, July 16, 2021⁹⁷

⁷³ see <https://www.sicherheitneudenken.de/rethinking-security-report-2022/>

⁷⁴ see <https://peace4future.de>

⁷⁵ see <https://peace4future.de/friedensmentoren/>

⁷⁶ see <https://www.sicherheitneudenken.de/mach-mit/prominente-unterstuetzer/organisationen-initiativen/>

⁷⁷ see <https://www.misereor.de/>


⁷⁸ see <https://kraft-der-gewaltfreiheit.org>

⁹⁷ Letter of support for the project peace4future.de

structural and international conflict events - and to contribute accordingly in these contexts (including in direct contact with parliamentarians) (up to and including corresponding career decisions).

In this way, young people find their own constructive impulses for action and translate them from the joint seminar experience into concrete self-selected projects of success. In these projects and the nationwide (and in the future also international) network that develops during the training and professionally coached projects, they experience self-efficacy.

This setting of methodology, structure and sustainability are the unique selling points of this approach, which incorporates the peace know-how of 44 organizations and numerous young studied peace and conflict researchers. www.peace4future.de



Donations

We would be delighted if you would support our Peace for Future project with a one-off or permanent donation.

Further information, the account details and the possibility to donate online can be found on our homepage at <https://www.sicherheit-neudenken.de/mach-mit/ich-spende>

Rethinking security – right now!

The Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy (CFFP), based in London and Berlin, rightly criticises the "Rise of Authoritarian Strongmen" as an expression of outdated traditional foreign and security policy.⁷⁹

Sustainable foreign and security policy strives for societies in which rights, resources and power are fairly distributed and patriarchal power structures and thought patterns are overcome.⁸⁰

Accordingly, the scenario "Rethinking Security – From Military to Civilian Security Policy", published in 2018 on behalf of the Evangelical Church in Baden, describes possible positive trends and negative developments in German and European civil security policy up to the year 2040 in three scenarios.⁸¹

The current development clearly follows the descriptions in the negative scenario. Nevertheless, the development towards a cooperative civil and sustainable security policy in Europe remains possible by 2040.

The scenario shows how the diverse existing approaches to a civil security policy can be consistently expanded in the future – and describes five pillars of civil security policy:

1. Fair economy and lifestyle
2. Sustainable development of the EU's neighbouring countries
3. Development of a global civil security architecture
4. Resilient democracy
5. Conversion of the Bundeswehr and the arms industry

The scenario recommends the medium-term negotiation and implementation of an economic and security partnership with Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) as well as development partnerships with the Arab League (LAS) and the African Union (AU) and provides for corresponding redeployments in the German federal budget from 2025.



"Warlike violence is a constitutive component of patriarchy.

A patriarchal foreign policy is based on dominance, destruction and violence."

"Feminist foreign policy is about creating safe and stable social structures preventively and in the long term."⁹⁸⁹⁹

Kristina Lunz, FR and DLF Kultur, March 8, 2022



"Women have a strong history and impact of initiative and motivate men, among others, to lay down their arms or not to use them."

Dr. Wolfgang Heinrich, Platform for Civil Conflict Management, September 23, 2021¹⁰⁰

⁷⁹ see, among others: Defense - "not a man's thing", tagesschau.de, March 13, 2022, <https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/europa/feministische-aussenpolitik-101.html>

⁸⁰ see Kristina Lunz, Handelsblatt-Interview, August 12, 2020, <https://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/management/vordenker/vordenkerin-kristina-lunz-ohne-feminismus-gibt-es-keinen-frieden/26065448.html?share=twitter&ticket=ST-2644211-Qgx7SzSofinVESXm5JKr-ap4>

⁸¹ see <https://www.sicherheitneudenken.de/sicherheit-neu-denken-unsere-vision/unsere-szenario/>

⁹⁸ Kristina Lunz in an interview with Frankfurter Rundschau, March 8, 2022, <https://www.fr.de/politik/kristina-lunz-feministische-aussenpolitik-frieden-centreforfeministforeignpolicy-ich-werde-als-dumm-und-naiv-beschimpft-91394203.html>

⁹⁹ see <https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/feministische-aussenpolitik-100.html>

¹⁰⁰ see https://www.sicherheitneudenken.de/media/download/variant/252686/2021-09-23_konflikte-mit-ziv-mitteln-bearbeiten_2_final_.pdf

The assessments of the current Ukraine war compiled in these orientation modules confirm the long-term perspective of the scenario and our initiative.

Our security continues to be threatened by the global developments listed in the Rethinking Security Report 2022, which require the paradigm shift towards a civilian sustainable security policy that we have described.⁸²

The uncertainty caused by Vladimir Putin's brutal war can and must be overcome in the medium to long term. For this purpose, the positive scenario with regard to the necessary construction of a European Peace and Security Order encompassing Russia and Ukraine in Europe describes the perspectives that are currently becoming all the more urgent.

Since 2019, a nationwide initiative for a sustainable civil security policy has been formed on the basis of the Rethinking Security scenario, which is so far supported by 41 German and 3 European organizations.

These impulses were written by the following members of the initiative's coordination group:

Ralf Becker (Evangelical Church in Baden)

Gerd Bauz (Martin Niemöller Foundation)

Elisabeth Freise (Church and Peace)

Eberhard Müller (EAK Württemberg)

Helmut Müller (AGF - Evangelical Church in the Rhineland)

Thomas Carl Schwoerer (Federal Spokesperson of the Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft – Vereinigte KriegsdienstgegnerInnen and editor of this translation)

Theodor Ziegler (Forum Friedensethik in der Ev. Landeskirche in Baden)

Andreas Zumach (Independent Journalist)

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"I am enthusiastic about the concrete steps and the positive vision of 'rethinking security'.

That is why I support the call for the education campaign of the same name. Peace policy is far more realistic than conventional 'realpolitik'."

Margot Käßmann, theologian and bestselling author¹⁰¹



"Rethinking security is a welcome and necessary part of the new enlightenment that our world so desperately needs."

Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Ernst Ulrich von Weizsäcker, Honorary President of the Club of Rome⁹⁸

⁸² see <https://www.sicherheitneudenken.de/rethinking-security-report-2022/>

¹⁰¹ see <https://www.sicherheitneudenken.de/mach-mit/prominente-unterstuetzer/prominente/>

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impasse Dr. Christine Schweitzer, Infoblatt BSV, February 8, 2022

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[The historical heritage of Ukraine](#), Prof. Dr. Andreas Kappeler, 2010

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[Berlin Memorandum "Rethinking Security – Ways of Peace in Europe"](#), Ines-Jacqueline Werkner et al., 2017

Audio

[With bare hands](#), DLF, March 15, 2022 (4 minutes)

[Making Peace People](#), DLF, February 28, 2022 (4 minutes)

Logic of Peace

	 SICHERHEITSLOGIK	 FRIEDENSLOGIK
Was ist das Problem?	Bedrohung, Gefahr, Unsicherheit <i>Handlungen orientieren sich an:</i> Gefahrenabwehr und Verteidigung	Gewalt, die stattfindet oder bevorsteht <i>Handlungen orientieren sich an:</i> Gewaltprävention und Gewaltabbau
Wodurch ist das Problem entstanden?	Durch Andere/von außen kommend <i>Handlungen zielen auf:</i> Schuldzuschreibung, Wahrung eigener Interessen	Als Folge komplexer Konflikte <i>Handlungen zielen auf:</i> Konflikttransformation auf der Grundlage einer komplexen Konfliktanalyse – eigene Konflikttanteile einbeziehend
Wie wird das Problem bearbeitet?	Durch Verteidigung und Selbstschutz <i>Handlungsansätze sind:</i> Abschottung, Ausbau des Sicherheitsapparats, Drohungen bis hin zum Einsatz von Gewaltmitteln	Durch kooperative Konfliktbearbeitung <i>Handlungsansätze sind:</i> Deeskalation, Schutzmaßnahmen für Opfer, gewaltlose Konfliktbearbeitung – dialogverträglich und prozessorientiert
Wodurch wird eigenes Handeln gerechtfertigt?	Mit dem Vorrang eigener Interessen <i>Rechtfertigung führt zu:</i> Relativierung, Unterordnung und Anpassung von Normen an eigene Interessen	Mit der Universalität von Menschen- und Völkerrecht <i>Rechtfertigung führt zu:</i> Werteorientierter Hinterfragung eigener Interessen und ihre Modifikation im Sinne der globalen Normen
Wie wird auf Scheitern und Misserfolg reagiert?	Mit Selbstbestätigung, ohne Selbstkritik <i>Handlungsfolge ist:</i> Verschärfung der bisher eingesetzten Mittel oder Rückzug in die Passivität	Mit offener, kritischer Reflexion <i>Handlungsfolge ist:</i> Einräumung von Problemen bzw. Fehlern und Suche nach gewaltfreien Alternativen

9 stages of conflict escalation according to Glasl

Figur 10.2: Die 9 Stufen der Konflikteskalation



6	7	8	9
Drohstrategien	Begrenzte Vernichtungsschläge	Zersplitterung	Gemeinsam in den Abgrund
Erpressung		Paralysieren und Desintegrieren des feindlichen Systems	kein Weg mehr zurück!
Drohung und Gegendrohung:	Denken in „Dingkategorie“	Abschnüren der Exponenten vom Hinterland	totale Konfrontation
Forderung // \\ Sank- Sank- tion == tions- potential	keine menschliche Qualität mehr	vitale Systemfaktoren zerstören, dadurch das Gegnersystem unsteuerbar, zerfällt gänzlich	Vernichtung zum Preis der Selbstvernichtung, Lust am Selbstmord, wenn auch der Feind zugrunde geht!
Glaubwürdigkeit: Proportionalität Selbstbindungsaktivitäten, Stolperdrähte	begrenzte Vernichtungsschläge als „passende Antwort“		
„second move“	Umkehren der Werte ins Gegenteil: relativ kleinerer eigener Schaden wird als Gewinn betrachtet		
Stress			
Akzeleration durch Ultimata, Scherenwirkung			